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A pragmatic investigation into the emotions of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and 
embarrassment: Lived experience and the challenge to established theory 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates what it means to experience the ‘self-conscious emotions’ of pride, shame, 
guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment and assesses the findings against established theories. Study 
1 collected qualitative data on real-world experiences of the emotions as experienced by social 
workers in England (N=21) and identifies and defines the components that constituted the 
experiences. Study 2 used vignettes to quantitatively test these concepts in a sample with a similar 
sociocultural context (N=124). The findings identify specific concepts for each emotion term with the 
exception of shame, which could not be distinguished from humiliation or embarrassment. This 
paper provides the first systematic analysis of all of these emotions within one study and has been 
the first to define the ‘relation-conscious emotions’ of acceptance and rejection as distinct emotions. 
In defining what it means to experience these emotions, these findings challenge established 
theories.  
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Introduction 
Pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment are classified as ‘self-conscious emotions’ and 
have been argued to be highly significant within the social sciences (Cooley, 1902; Lynd, 1958; 
Goffman, 1959). Yet, while these terms have been studied and theorized for over a hundred years 
(e.g. Darwin, 1872; Freud, 1905/1962; Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 2000), there remain many contrasting 
and contradictory statements between authors on what they mean. Such disagreements may make 
very little difference in everyday communication because we assume we know what someone 
means when they say, ‘I feel ashamed’, for example. They do make a difference, however, from a 
research perspective when it comes to making claims from a specific investigation or reviewing the 
evidence from many studies.  
Such academic differences about what these terms mean usually come about because of 
philosophical and theoretical commitments taken prior to defining the terms. Indeed, such 
commitments often lead the methodological approach taken to investigate them (see Morgan, 
2007), influencing any conclusions drawn and ultimately the theories developed. This paper critically 
analyzes the main philosophical foundations for emotion theory and locates theories of self-
conscious emotions within these. With beliefs about what emotions are prior to investigating them, 
the majority of research into this group of emotions has tended to rely on some sort of retrospective 
self-reporting or occasionally the sorting of vignettes (Crozier, 2014). There has been very little 
systematic research into real-time, real-world, context-specific experiences of these emotions. 
Furthermore, while there have been many studies into the self-conscious emotions (e.g.  Gilbert et 
al., 1994; Miller and Tangney 1994; Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995; Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Elshout et 
al., 2016), it is rare for all of them to be included in the same investigation, limiting claims about the 
relationship between them. 
Given this gap in the research base, and given the competing perspectives on what these terms 
mean, this paper reports on a pragmatic approach (James, 1907; Dewey, 1929; Mead, 1934) to the 
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study of the terms pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment. While Menand (1997) 
argues that pragmatism is an account of the way people think, James (1907:45) argued that 
pragmatism “is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be 
interminable”. Indeed, pragmatism seeks to go beyond discussion of definitions to investigate not 
just the meaning of signs and symbols but also their practical effects. Pierce (1905) and James (1907) 
argued that it is the culmination of the meaning, sensations, actions, and effects of a term that make 
up our total conception of such terms. To undertake such investigations, Emirbayer and Maynard 
(2010) state pragmatism calls for a return to experience without a commitment to prior ontological 
positions. Instead, the focus is on actual experience, the beliefs that stand behind that experience, 
and the consequences that are likely to follow that experience (Morgan, 2007). Given this pragmatic 
approach, Morgan (2007) argues it may be possible to settle metaphysical disputes by considering 
what difference it makes to believe one way of thinking over another. 
The first study collected qualitative data by using observational methods to explore the pragmatic 
meaning of the terms in real-world, real-time, experiences of social workers in England. Abductive 
reasoning was used to convert observations into theories and then assess these theories by moving 
back and forth between induction and deduction (Peirce, 1903). While there was variation in 
individual experience, analyzing the culmination of self-conscious emotional experiences categorized 
with specific emotion terms identified each term to signify different combinations of cognitive, 
relational, contextual, and attitudinal meanings. While these are defined, they can be considered as 
ideal-typical conceptualizations, i.e. an abstract concept developed out of experience that can be 
used to analyze social reality (Weber, 1978). It was hypothesized, therefore, that if these ideal-types 
indicated the pragmatic meaning of the emotion terms, then others within the same sociocultural 
group would be able to identify these conceptions as an instance of the proposed emotion. A second 
quantitative study was undertaken, therefore, to test these emotion concepts within a wider 
population with a similar sociocultural background (N=124) using vignettes created from the 
concepts from the first study. Participants were indeed able to identify the emotions as expected, 
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indicating that the terms have specific meanings, with the exception of shame, which seemed to be 
a term that was considered to have a wider pragmatic meaning.  
This is the first study to use the pragmatic method to study self-conscious emotions and one of the 
only studies to date to employ participant observation as a method to explore the meaning of 
specific emotions as used and experienced in context. The findings challenge established theories on 
these emotion terms as none were able to fully explain and predict lived, and communicated, 
experience. Furthermore, these findings not only challenge the proposed link between shame and 
rejection (e.g Scheff, 2000), and pride and acceptance (e.g. Scheff, 2014), but identifies rejection and 
acceptance as specific emotions terms in their own right, conceptualized here in contrast to ‘self-
conscious emotions’ as ‘relation-conscious emotions’. And further still, these findings are used to 
consider the usefulness of the philosophical commitments that influenced the construction of 
established theories on these emotions. To begin, this paper provides an analysis of the different 
theoretical propositions of these emotions, before detailing the two studies and their findings. The 
culmination of these findings are then discussed in relation to theorizing pride, shame, guilt, 
humiliation, and embarrassment.  
Conceptions of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment 
While the field of emotion theory is complex, Gendron and Barrett (2009) broadly categorise 
conceptions of emotions into three differing foundations: emotions as basic entities, as appraisals, 
or as psychological constructions, to which we can also add social constructions and psychoanalytic 
models. Each provides a different way of perceiving what an emotion is and, therefore, provides 
different ways of explaining and predicting emotional experience. While not all theories, or 
theorists, will fit neatly into such categories, this framing does demonstrate the pertinent issues that 
emotion theorists have been grappling with for over a century and how established theories on self-
conscious emotions can be located within this.  
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Basic emotion models propose that some emotions are genetically transmitted mechanisms that are 
hard-wired within every human’s brain and are, therefore, distinct and irreducible. Once this 
mechanism is triggered, a universal pattern of sensations and behaviors follow. Tomkins (1963) was 
the first to argue that shame was a basic emotion by arguing it was an ‘affect’ that was ‘triggered’ 
from the impediment of enjoyment or interest. His ideas influenced Nathanson (1994), who accepts 
and promotes Tomkins’ view, Elison (2005), who claims shame is a basic emotion elicited by 
perceived devaluation (rejection) while guilt is a socio-legal condition linked to any basic emotion, 
and Scheff (2003, 2014), who argues shame and pride relate to a ‘bond affect’, where threats to a 
social bond (rejection) trigger shame and secure bonds trigger pride (acceptance). With shame 
conceptualized as a basic emotion, Tomkins, Nathanson, Elison, and Scheff all argue that 
embarrassment, humiliation, and guilt (except Elison) are simply different terms for the same 
emotion. Others, however, claim that self-conscious emotions stem from socialized responses to 
triggered basic emotions. Gilbert (2003), for example, argues anger is blended with a threat to one’s 
self-representation to produce shame, while guilt is a result of basic emotions blending with 
sensitivity to the needs of others. Kemper (1987), meanwhile, argues that shame is a socialized 
response to arousal of the physiological conditions of the primary emotion of anger, with guilt a 
socialized response from fear, and pride a socialized response from satisfaction. Furthermore, Solms 
and Zellner’s (2012) analysis of Freud’s (1905[1962]) psychoanalytic model of emotion, which 
assumes emotions occur when instinctual drives are blocked from expression, demonstrates his 
theory assumed biological entities at the core of the experience. Basic emotion theories argue the 
behavioral response of shame is one of hiding or avoiding and guilt of reparations of the perceived 
mistake. 
Appraisal models consider emotions to be defined by the meaning a person attributes to events 
(Arnold, 1960). Within this perspective, an emotion has antecedents, which trigger a range of 
evaluations within the perceiver, resulting in a response (Frijda, 1986). While appraisal theories 
argue there are many components to the experience of an emotion, they place the appraisal as the 
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central element as they are considered to trigger and differentiate emotional episodes (Ellsworth, 
2013; Moors et al., 2013). Tangney and Dearing’s (2002) appraisal theory follows the work of Lewis 
(1971) to propose that shame and guilt are evoked as a result of moral transgressions. Shame is 
considered to be experienced when a person believes the ‘self’ is the reason for their moral failure, 
which results in a desire to hide, escape, or strike back, while guilt is experienced when the person 
believes the reason is their behavior, which results in a desire to confess, apologize, or repair. While 
Gausel and Leach’s (2011) theory also argues shame results from a negative self-evaluation, they 
claim shame leads to pro-social behaviors. They suggest that a negative evaluation from another, i.e. 
rejection, should be distinguished from shame. Tracy and Robin’s (2004) appraisal theory argues that 
embarrassment results from becoming aware of a discrepancy between the public aspects of the 
‘self’, such as one's appearance, and others' evaluations, while they argue that pride stems from a 
person believing they have lived up to some actual or ideal self-representation and shame that they 
have failed to live up to such self-representations. While there are many debates between appraisal 
models (see Sabini and Silver, 1997, as an example), humiliation is often overlooked, or simply 
considered a form of shame, in such debates. Klein (1991), however, claims humiliation results from 
the belief that the person has been ridiculed, scorned, or experienced contempt, or other degrading 
treatment at the hands of others. 
At the heart of constructionist accounts of emotions is a relational perspective of human life, where 
a person is engaged in interactions with their social environment. Rather than claim there are 
universal ways people feel self-conscious emotions, as basic emotion and appraisal models do, 
constructionists claim the social context is a central component of the experience. Boiger et al. 
(2014), for example, found the typical appraisals associated with shame differed between 
participants from the US, Japan, and Belgium. Harkins (1996), however, claimed that not all cultures 
and languages have a concept identical in meaning to the English term shame. Different versions of 
constructionism, however, hold different views on what emotions are. ‘Weak’ social constructionist 
theories accept the existence of basic emotions but claim that socialization alters how these are 
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experienced. Turner (2000), for example, argues that shame and guilt are socially constructed from 
the primary emotion of sadness with differing amounts of fear and anger producing shame or guilt. 
‘Strong’ social constructionists (e.g. Gordon, 1981) and psychological constructionists (e.g. Barrett, 
2006), meanwhile, deny the existence of basic emotions and consider appraisals to be but one 
component of the experience of an emotion. The basic argument is that over time a person learns 
culturally specific ways of perceiving, understanding, and communicating about their interactions 
and emotions are one element of this learning process. Specific dimensions of experience, such as 
situational cues, social stimuli, bodily sensations, appraisals, and expressive gestures, are learnt as 
an ‘emotion’ and categorized with an emotion term.  
From such a perspective, self-conscious emotions are defined in relation to others. Gordon (1981) 
argues shame, pride, guilt, and embarrassment stem from imagining how other people judge our 
appearance to them. de Rivera and Grinkis (1986) state shame is experienced from the contempt 
expressed by others. Harré (1990) claims shame stems from realizing others have become aware of a 
moral infraction and that the person agrees with this judgement, while embarrassment stems from 
realizing others have become aware of a breach of convention or code of manners and that the 
person agrees with that opinion. While Pattison (2000) asserts that shame is ‘toxic unwantedness’ 
and Elshout et al. (2016) consider humiliation as the experience of feeling powerless, small, and 
inferior in a situation where one is brought down in front of an audience, which involves appraisals 
of the situation as unfair and feelings of disappointment, anger, and shame.  
While the focus of this paper is on experiences of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and 
embarrassment, the above discussion demonstrates that issues of acceptance and rejection 
permeate the theories of these emotions, no matter what foundation is used to construct the 
theory, either to define them as part of self-conscious emotions or in contrast to them.   
Researching pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment 
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It has become somewhat of a dogma in social research that one’s ontological position leads one’s 
epistemological stance, which ultimately leads one’s methodology and data collection methods 
(Bryman, 2015). Rather than starting with ontological assumptions, however, pragmatism starts with 
experience and then asks what this tells us about what methods are necessary to inquire about this 
experience on a practical level, on the one hand, and what this tells us about epistemological issues 
on an abstract level, on the other (Morgan, 2007). While pragmatists have traditionally used 
symbolic interactionism as a methodology (Barbalet, 2009), Emirbayer and Maynard (2010) argue 
ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) provides an equally appropriate approach for pragmatic 
research. What both have in common is the primary position of inquiring about lived experience. 
Building on such arguments for a study into pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment, we 
can ask, how do people experience these emotions? And what does this tell us about how best to 
conceptualize them?  
Study 1 
Methodology 
Participants: After consultation with a number of social work departments in England, one, referred 
to throughout this paper as ‘the Council’, agreed to support the research, providing access to 
individuals operating within a similar cultural context. People within the department were informed 
of the research and 21 consented to participate. Ethical approval was granted through the University 
ethical review panel.  Experience as a social worker ranged from less than one year to 24 years, age 
ranged from 24 years to 63 years, there was one male and the rest were female, and there was one 
Black-Caribbean social worker and the rest were White-British. 
Context: The organization provided public services to one large area in England and the social work 
department provided services to the children and families within the region. The service was 
organized into teams, with a number of social workers and a team manager, whom had 
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responsibility for the work within the team. The social workers’ role was to work with children and 
families to improve their situation and ensure children did not suffer harm. Where a child was 
identified as potentially suffering harm, a multiagency team was brought together to create a plan to 
help and support the family, coordinated by a chairperson.  
The context of social work within England can be seen within the context of wider public sector 
reform, which has sought to create greater effectiveness, efficiency, and value for money by setting 
out clear objectives, standards, and indicators for practice that are then audited to make 
judgements about the quality of the service (Power, 1997). Services are then graded and ranked, 
with the possibility of being placed in ‘special measures’ for being perceived to be ‘failing’. 
Consequently, social workers are tasked with ensuring they produce the correct data for the 
organization to gain a positive inspection result on top of seeking to help and support the families. 
Social workers were, therefore, not only evaluating themselves and what they do but are being 
evaluated by others, with judgements being passed on how good their work was or how good they 
were at doing it. Such a context heightened their self-consciousness while practicing, creating many 
opportunities to experience self-conscious emotions.  
Data Collection: To be able to contextualize the emotional experiences of the participants, publically 
available documentation on the social work service were collected. I then observed the social 
workers undertaking their daily work within the office, meetings, and with families who consented 
to me observing for one to two days per week over a six month period in 2014. I discussed what I 
had observed or heard with the participants to clarify or gain a better understanding of the 
experience. Fieldnotes were taken throughout the day according to advice provided by Emerson et 
al. (2011) in a note book that I carried around with me. In total, I conducted 246.5 hours of 
observations. Any instance where a participant categorized their experience as pride, shame, guilt, 
humiliation, and embarrassment, or acceptance or rejection, either at the time, or later in discussion 
with me, was included in the dataset for this study.  
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To collect data on a wider set of self-conscious emotional experiences, a semi-structured diary sheet 
was given to each member of the team at the end of the day to complete. This asked participants to 
“describe any situation which made you feel good/bad about yourself today”. From these situations, 
the participants were asked to describe what they were thinking at the time along with any bodily 
sensations they felt. Following Scherer’s (2005) social scientific methodology on collecting data on 
emotions, participants were then asked to write down what word or words they would use to 
describe how they felt in that situation and then to choose which word or words most closely 
corresponded to their experience from the following list: pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, 
embarrassment, acceptance and rejection. Finally, the diary sheet asked participants what 
behaviors, actions, or attitudes of theirs changed as part of this experience. In total, I collected 99 
diary entries.  
To further explore the experience of these emotions seventeen social workers and two team 
managers were interviewed using open questions about their experiences of pride, shame, guilt, 
humiliation, and embarrassment in practice. Each interview was conducted in an interview room 
within a Council building. Interviews lasted between 55 and 100 minutes and were recorded on a 
digital recording device, transferred to a computer, and transcribed verbatim.  
Data Analysis 
Grounded theory methods were employed, where the analysis and collection or data were 
undertaken simultaneously. Only emotional episodes that were categorized with the specific terms 
under study were included in the dataset for analysis. As the data collection phase progressed, these 
experiences were coded line by line in a Word document (Glaser, 1978), enabling an inductive 
analysis of these episodes that generated theoretical ideas about patterns and processes, similarities 
and differences. These inductive ideas were then used to guide subsequent observations and 
discussions to collect more data that enabled a deductive analysis of these ideas, which included 
contradictory data (Charmaz, 2006). This ongoing process integrated the diary entries, observations, 
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and interviews, providing a conceptual analysis of each emotion term. The number of emotional 
experiences, as categorized by participants, broken down by method of data collection, is provided 
in table 1. By comparing data with data, data with codes, and codes with codes, categories were 
created for each emotion term. As consistent with grounded theory methodology, these categories 
were then considered in relation to a range of theoretical codes considered relevant to these 
emotional experiences (see Glaser, 1978, 1998, 2005), enabling a conceptualization of each term.  
Table 1: Emotional experiences by method of data collection 
Emotion Term Diary Entries Observations Interviews Total 
Pride 29 9 10 48 
Shame 7 31 17 55 
Guilt 16 16 4 36 
Humiliation 3 3 1 7 
Embarrassment 8 10 11 29 
Acceptance 19 6 7 32 
Rejection 5 9 3 17 
The number of episodes of each emotion as categorized by participants according to data collection method 
 
Limitations: It is acknowledged that the presence of an observer can affect what people say and do. 
My discussions with participants and completing a diary entry could also alter what a participant 
thought about an experience and how they discussed it with me. The resulting data and analysis can, 
therefore, be understood within the context of my interactions and interpretations within the 
teams, within the Council, at that specific time. What this study does provide, however, is an 
interpretive analysis of the experiences of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, and embarrassment 
among the participants that suggests how these emotions were experienced by these participants 
within this context.  
Findings 
No individual experience of an emotion was the same. Each experience had its own nuance and 
complexity, which could only be understood through the range of data collection methods. The 
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observations, for example, were not sufficient to analyze the emotional experience of a situation. 
The discussions about the situations and the diary entries provided the rich detail needed to 
understand what was part of the experience and how it was understood by the experiencer. Equally, 
the diary entries and discussions needed to be contextualized and embedded within their social 
contexts to fully understand the experience. My observations of one private conversation between a 
social worker and their team manager, termed supervision, for example, did not suggest any 
particularly strong emotional feelings, yet the situation was recorded in the diary entry by the social 
worker as follows:  
“[Situation:]  In supervision with team manager I wanted to discuss feeling undermined 
but felt like I wasn’t understood and it took ages to get across my point, I 
still felt at the end of it that my point wasn’t understood properly.  
[Thinking:]  Annoyed – felt a bit worthless and misunderstood. Felt disappointed in my 
T.M. [team manager] who I always thought I got on with and understood 
me.  
[Bodily sensations:]  I was going hot, then cold – I was tense. I tried to get my point across by 
using hand gestures 
[Categorized as:]   Rejection. Humiliation. Embarrassment. Anger 
[Change:]  I tried to defend myself – in future I’m worried I might not address issues 
which upset me as I felt it backfired and made me look ‘silly’” 
While this situation was categorized with multiple terms, not all experiences of humiliation, or 
indeed embarrassment, were consistent with such an experience. Yet despite the emotional 
heterogeneity across individual experiences of emotions, a range of components could be identified 
as significant across the range of experiences. These components were, firstly, whether the 
experience was positively or negatively valenced; secondly, whether the focus of the experience was 
an evaluation by the self or by another person; thirdly, whether this evaluation was of the person’s 
‘self’ or their behavior; fourthly, whether the person felt personal responsibility for the evaluation; 
fifthly, the social context in which the episode took place; and sixthly, for some emotions there was 
a clear change in attitude involved in the experience, whereas for some there was not. Each emotion 
will be addressed in turn:  
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Pride: Experiences of pride typically involved a person feeling personally responsible for a situation 
in which they evaluated themselves positively as a result to living up to some standard they 
considered important. They were usually reported to involve an increase in confidence and 
determination in their work, as demonstrated by the following diary entry, which shows a typical 
experience of pride:  
“[Situation:]  Achieving a visit to see a disengaged teenager who has moved out of area. I 
had to persuade TM [team manager] to keep case open to me, as it is in 
childs [sic] best interests.  
[Thinking:]  Happy, pleased that I had been persistent and patient. Visit went well.  
[Bodily sensations:]  Relaxed, lots of smiles.  
[Description:]  Felt like I had achieved what others had been unable to – Proud, patient.  
[Categorized as:]   Pride 
[Change:] I have learnt that with some service users it is important to adopt different 
approaches also, to challenge decisions I don’t think are in child’s best 
interests” 
Acceptance: While some experiences were categorized as pride and acceptance, these could be 
distinguished. Indeed, while experiences categorized solely as acceptance were positively valenced, 
the focus was on the actions or perceived intentions of other people, which was seen to encourage 
social interaction. Typically no changes in behavior or attitude were reported along with feeling 
accepted, with most people leaving the ‘change’ section as blank on the diary log, as the following 
typical entry of acceptance shows:   
“[Situation:]  I visited a family who were previously very hostile however are now very 
cooperative and pleasant. The case will end soon 
[Thinking:]   How well the family had progressed 
[Bodily Sensations:]  I felt relaxed 
[Description:]  I felt accepted 
[Categorized as:]   Acceptance” 
Shame: Experiences categorized as shame were always considered negative and typically stemmed 
from a social worker feeling personally responsible for a situation in which they evaluated 
themselves negatively as a result of failing to meet a standard they considered important. There was 
no discernible pattern to changes in behavior or attitude in the shame experiences. Some reported 
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hiding or distancing themselves from others, some reported no changes, while others reported pro-
social approach-type behaviors when experiencing shame, as the following diary entry 
demonstrates:  
“[Situation:]  Not addressing an assessment I need to undertake. It is in relation to DV 
[domestic violence]. Father controlling and monitoring mother’s phone.  
[Thinking:]  Oh shit – I have got to deal with this and not leave it any longer. How can 
this be planned safely. I need to talk to manager. I need guidance so I don’t 
make a situation worse.  
[Bodily Sensations:]  None 
[Description:]   I felt shame as I was bloody annoyed with myself 
[Categorized as:]  Shame 
[Change:]  I had/requested a mini supervision with the manager. I beat myself up over 
things anyway and I’m my own worst critic” 
Rejection: While experiences of shame could involve a negative evaluation of another, this was not a 
necessary component, as the above diary entry shows. Indeed, where a negative evaluation from 
another was a feature of the experience this was always categorized as rejection along with other 
terms such as shame, humiliation, or embarrassment. The negative other-evaluation was 
experienced as discouraging social interaction, leaving the person to either enforce interaction with 
them or withdraw, as the following diary entry shows:  
“[Situation:]  I came to work this morning feeling anxious about an error from the 
previous day that I had attempted to rectify which I feel/felt was/is out of 
my control and had potential disciplinary consequences. I was anxious 
about the managers uneasy feeling towards a professionals meeting I was 
having today.  
[Thinking:]  I felt responsible for my error, responsible for any potential consequences 
for me and my team manager as a result of my actions. I felt conscious of 
what others would think of me and my practice.  
[Description:]   I felt tense, emotionally sensitive.  
[Categorized as:]   Rejection, Shame, Anxiety 
[Change:]  I was (felt) less confident–open up for criticism” 
This experience was a complex one of bodily sensations, thoughts about the social context and how 
she perceived herself, how she was perceived by others, and how she felt about her work as a 
consequence of the experience. She felt responsible for the negative evaluation she had given 
herself and the negative evaluation she perceived from her manager and others in her team. 
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Humiliation: Humiliation was a negatively valenced experience that typically involved another 
person intentionally treating them badly. With the involvement of another person the situation was 
necessarily public, although it often involved more than just two people, as the following example 
demonstrates:  
“She said at that time an email went round with a list of all the social workers names on with the 
number of cases they had and the names were colour coded, red (too many cases), amber (case load 
was too high), and green (caseload was ok). She said her name was on the top of the list and that she 
was told that she had too many cases because of her time management so she had to photocopy her 
diary and account for every minute of her time. She spoke with a slightly raised voice and spoke 
quickly and forcefully. She said ‘it was the most humiliating experience of my professional life’ and 
said ‘it feels like being punched’” (fieldnotes) 
While there were only a small number of experiences of humiliation, they were all associated with 
some form of resistance to the imposed negative evaluation, as one participant said “it makes me 
more defensive”. This defensiveness was not always explicit, however. While this was sometimes a 
direct defense of their identity or behavior to the person treating them negatively, it was at times a 
defense to others outside of the situation, such as to colleagues in the safety of their team room.  
Guilt: Typically guilt related to experiences where the person perceived their actions to have 
transgressed a moral boundary. For example, a social worker could feel guilty for not being busy and 
feeling relaxed, as this contravened the accepted cultural standard for a social worker that provided 
the message within the Council that they should be busy, as demonstrated by the following diary 
entry: 
“[Situation:]   That I wasn’t so busy today in the office. I felt guilty.  
[Thinking:]  I can think! I’m not rushed off my feet. I can get my paperwork done. Felt 
guilty for taking advantage of the lull.  
[Bodily sensations:]  Relaxed.  
[Feeling:]   Guilt” 
More typically, however, experiences of guilt involved a focus on how their actions had transgressed 
the moral boundary of disadvantaging or harming another person and most often involved a desire 
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to repair or make amends. While this was often a negative experience, it was not necessarily so, as 
this diary entry shows:  
“[Situation:]  This afternoon I had to inform a young mum that her partner was a DV 
[domestic violence] perpetrator who has other children subject to CP [child 
protection] plans 
[Thinking:]  How the mum would take this information and the impact that this will 
have upon the relationship and child. The mother was initially very angry 
with me but then explained that this was because she was upset. I felt sad 
for the mother 
[Bodily Sensations:]  I felt tense at the beginning of the conversation but relaxed and was able 
to offer mum some reassurance. The situation was displeasurable 
[Categorized as:]   Guilt. Important 
[Change:]  Because I felt that my role was important in safeguarding both mother and 
baby I was able to explain the next step to mum calmly. I felt guilty for 
upsetting her with the information” 
This diary entry was classified as a positive experience by the social worker because she considered 
what she was doing as important and therefore it felt good. She felt guilty because she had 
transgressed the moral boundary of upsetting the mother. Indeed, there were other instances in 
which participants categorized their experience as guilt and pride.  
Embarrassment: Experiences of embarrassment did not usually involve a negative self-evaluation. 
The focus was on how other people viewed them and how this related to how they thought they 
should be viewed. This self-discrepancy could be a positive experience, as demonstrated by the 
following interview with a social worker who had been praised by a family she was working with:  
“Interviewer: how does it feel to get that sort of feedback? 
Social Worker: I dunno? Good. Embarrassing… 
Interviewer: what’s embarrassing about it? 
Social Worker: …there’s a stigma around the fact that social workers are really bad and you 
shouldn’t like them…I do worry when people do like me, when there’s one family 
that, she absolutely hated me, now she really quite likes me and she’ll talk to me 
now and I think, ‘am I doing this right because you’re meant to still hate me’ and I 
think ‘maybe it’s me?’” (interview) 
While it felt good to be praised, this exposed a discrepancy between being liked and wanting to be a 
good social worker, which, to her, should not be liked. The positive exposure that some situations 
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provided meant embarrassment was a term used in the diary entries to categorize some experiences 
alongside pride and acceptance. Embarrassment was also, however, used to indicate a negative 
experience of a self-discrepancy, as the following diary entry demonstrated:  
“[Situation:]  Experiencing a migraine at 4am resulted in me not feeling well. I needed to 
go to a core group meeting in [place]. I went to the family home where the 
meeting [sic] are usually held, however the venue had been changed 
without my knowledge. I therefore was 45 mins late for the meeting I 
needed to make a decision about attendance given I did not know the area 
 [Thinking:]  A feeling of how can I make this right 
 [Bodily Sensations:]  Tightness in the shoulders and neck 
 [Description:]   Demoralized. Unprofessional due to poor communication  
 [Categorized:]   Embarrassment 
[Change:]  I took a deep breath. Found the telephone number of the other social 
worker attending the meeting advised her of the situation. Provided an 
update ensured she has all relevant info ensured she would pass on my 
apologies I felt it appropriate not to disturb a meeting 45 mins late” 
 
While this social worker thought she was perceived as unprofessional, she did not feel personally 
responsible for the situation, blaming poor communication on the reason for this self-discrepancy. 
There was no discernible pattern of behavioral responses or changes in attitude associated with 
experiences categorized as embarrassment.  
Summary 
Experiences of these emotions were complex, individually specific, and contextual. On the one hand 
there was variability not only between the categories, e.g. experiences of shame and guilt were 
qualitatively different, but also within the categories, e.g. not all experiences of shame were the 
same. Indeed, some experiences contained defined cognitive content but no change in the 
experience of bodily sensations or some strong cognitive content and bodily sensations but no 
perceived effect on the person’s actions. Furthermore, there were experiences which, when 
observed, did not suggest any emotional experience yet were recorded in the diary entries as 
emotional.  
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On the other hand, however, there were a set of components that were common to experiences 
categorized with the same term, which made them an instance of the emotion and distinguished 
them from the other terms. These common components can be used to create a set of ideal-typical 
emotion concepts. Weber (1978) developed the notion of ideal-types to provide an analytical tool to 
express a hypothetical, abstract concept that can be used to analyze social reality. Freund (1969) 
argues that ideal-types clarify the most important elements of empirical reality, which Weber (1978) 
believed could be used to ascertain similarities and deviations in concrete cases. These ideal-typical 
emotion concepts that have been identified from this study are outlined in table 2.  
Table 2: Emotion concepts 
 Valence Focus of 
Experience 
Object of 
Evaluation 
Personal 
Responsibility 
Social Context Change in attitude 
Pride Positive Self-
Evaluation  
Self or 
Behavior 
Yes Living up to a personal 
standard 
Increased 
confidence 
Acceptance Positive Other-
Evaluation 
Self or 
Behavior 
No Social interaction 
encouraged by others 
- 
Shame Negative Self-
Evaluation 
Self Yes Failing to meet a 
personal standard 
- 
Rejection Negative Other-
Evaluation 
Self or 
Behavior 
No Social interaction 
discouraged by others  
- 
Guilt Positive or 
Negative  
Self-
Evaluation 
Behavior Yes Moral transgression / 
consequence of action 
Desire to make 
amends 
Humiliation Negative Other-
Evaluation 
Self No Intentional public 
devaluing 
Desire to defend 
self from public 
devaluation 
Embarrassment Positive or 
Negative 
Other-
Evaluation 
Self or 
Behavior 
No Publically exposed 
self-discrepancy 
- 
 
Study 2 
Study 1 defined the experience of pride, shame, guilt, humiliation, embarrassment, acceptance, and 
rejection of the participants from a pragmatic perspective, i.e. identified the common components 
that constituted the experiences. If these emotion concepts did indeed relate to an understanding 
within that group of what these emotion terms mean, the corollary was that a person should be able 
to clearly identify these concepts as an instance of the emotion. It was, therefore, hypothesized that 
these concepts would predict how those within a similar sociocultural context would categorize self-
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conscious emotional episodes (H1). In other words, an ideal-typical experience of shame would be 
categorized as shame. This is in contrast to some basic emotion theories (Tomkins, 1963; Scheff, 
2000) that propose there would be no difference, other than intensity, between shame and the 
other negatively valenced experiences, or that shame equates to rejection and pride to acceptance 
(Scheff, 2014). Equally, this would be in contrast to some appraisal models (Tangney and Dearing, 
2002) that propose shame and guilt are so intertwined that people do not experience them 
separately and use the terms interchangeably. Indeed, many appraisal theories define shame and 
guilt as moral emotions (e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Tracy and Robins, 2004), while study 1 
suggested that an ideal-typical experience of shame related to failing to meet personal standards, 
rather than moral transgressions. Failing to meet a standard could, of course, be a moral issue but it 
is not necessarily so. It was, therefore, hypothesized that shame would be less distinguishable from 
guilt as a result of a moral transgression as this would be a deviation from the ideal-typical 
experience of shame and closer to an ideal-typical experience of guilt (H1a). Finally, many basic 
emotion models and appraisal theories consider shame to be a public experience. Indeed, this is 
what Tangney et al. (1996) found in their analyses of personal narratives of shame. The findings from 
study 1 contradict such propositions, as failing to meet a personal standard may have been evoked 
while in public but it was very much experienced as private. It was, therefore, hypothesized that 
shame would be considered a private experience, rather than a public one (H1b).  
Study 1 also identified that people can categorize their experience with more than one emotion 
term. A person may say, for example, that they felt embarrassment, shame, and humiliation. It is 
possible, as many basic emotion theories argue, that these are simply different terms for the same 
emotional experience. If these emotion concepts meaningfully relate to distinct experiences, 
however, it was hypothesized that one emotion would be felt more strongly than others, and that 
the difference between them would be significant (H2), if that experience closely resembled an 
ideal-typical emotion concept. A person may say they feel humiliated and embarrassed, for example, 
but if the experience closely resembled to the concept for humiliation, a person would feel 
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humiliation much more strongly than embarrassment. Support for these hypotheses would provide 
evidence for a broad consensus on what these emotion terms mean within the sample.  
Methodology 
Participants: Students within the department of social policy and social work at the University of 
Birmingham, UK, were asked to participate, providing a population of a broadly similar sociocultural 
background to the population in study 1. One hundred and twenty four students agreed. Twenty 
percent were male, 79% were female, and 1% non-binary. Age ranged from 18 to 55 years old 
(M=24.38, SD=8.04). One hundred and seven participants were enrolled on an undergraduate 
programme and 17 on a postgraduate programme.    
Procedure and measures: The vignette approach was considered appropriate to investigate the 
hypotheses. Vignettes are short descriptions of situations that contain the relevant information 
about the phenomena under study that participants then evaluate (Rossi and Anderson 1982). The 
emotion concepts of study 1 were translated into vignettes, in a third person narrative, using gender 
neutral names, so the focus of the participants’ evaluation of the situation was their idea of  
experiences of shame, etc., rather than the specifics of whether they would experience the emotion 
in that specific context. The vignettes are provided in table 3.  
Table 3: Vignettes of emotion concepts 
Emotion Vignette 
Guilt 
(consequence 
focus) 
Alex has been friends with Cameron since childhood. They have a close friendship and care about 
one another. Cameron has a really big opportunity and asks Alex to do something really important 
for her/him the next day to help out. Alex has a really busy and stressful day at work and forgets. 
Alex then worries about the consequence for Cameron and feels bad about forgetting. However, 
Alex knows this is very unusual for her/him and believes this is a genuine mistake. Even still, Alex 
decides s/he really needs to make it up to Cameron and decides to go over to Cameron’s house 
that night to apologize. 
Shame 
 
 
 
Riley is at University and likes to think of her/himself as a very clever person. S/he is also known by 
her/his fellow students as a very clever person. Riley has a very important exam coming up for a 
job s/he really wants and Riley has been studying hard for it. Riley feels ready for the exam when 
the day comes. 
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Private 
 
None of her/his fellow students know s/he is going for this exam. Riley gets the 
results sent to her/him in the post and opens them on her/his own. Riley reads that 
s/he got a very low score. Riley finds it hard to believe at first but then thinks this 
must be because s/he is not clever enough and has been fooling her/himself all 
her/his life about how clever s/he is. Riley starts to feel hot and begins to hear 
her/his heart race. In that moment Riley feels very small 
Public All of Riley’s fellow students know s/he is going for this exam. Riley’s results get sent 
to her/his college and s/he opens them with her friends around her. Everyone sees 
that Riley has a very low score. Riley finds it hard to believe at first but then thinks 
this must be because s/he is not clever enough and not only has s/he been fooling 
her/himself all her/his life about how clever s/he is, but now everyone knows. Riley 
starts to feel hot and begins to hear her/his heart race. In that moment Riley wants 
the ground to open up and swallow her/him. 
Moral 
Transgression 
 
 
Riley believes s/he is a very moral person and is known by her/his friends and family as so. Riley 
works in a shop and one day a new laptop is delivered. Riley can’t find any record of one being 
ordered and there is no paperwork to verify this delivery. After two days of no one claiming it, 
Riley is sure it was delivered by mistake and Riley takes it home.  
Shame 
 
 
 
Riley can’t help but feel bad about this and thinks s/he must be a terrible person for 
taking something that isn’t hers/his. Riley starts to feel very hot and feels her/his 
heart racing. Riley hides the laptop in her/his house and doesn’t tell anyone about it. 
Guilt Riley can’t help but feel bad about this and thinks s/he must try harder to return it to 
the person it belongs to. Riley takes it back to the shop the next day and contacts the 
delivery company. Eventually Riley finds the person it belongs to and apologizes that 
s/he did not get it to them sooner. 
Embarrassment 
 
Alex is walking and chatting outside with friends when Alex trips up. Alex’s friends laugh and make 
a friendly joke of it. Alex thinks s/he looked silly for a moment and starts to feel hot and s/he 
blushes. Alex makes a joke of it and they laugh and continue walking and chatting together. 
Humiliation 
 
Alex believes s/he is a very competent worker. S/he has to present some information in a meeting 
at work. Alex’s boss and many other people s/he does not know very well are in this meeting. In 
the middle of Alex’s presentation Alex’s boss tells Alex s/he has got it all wrong and is 
incompetent. Alex believes this to be unjust and unfair. Alex tries to say something but her/his 
boss won’t let Alex speak and tells Alex to leave. Alex thinks her/his boss was being nasty and 
made her/him look bad on purpose. Alex feels devalued and degraded and felt her/his heart 
pound and her/his muscles tense. Alex doesn’t think s/he has done anything wrong and actually 
did her/himself proud in the meeting.  S/he can’t stop thinking about how badly s/he was treated 
and wants retribution. 
Rejection 
 
Alex is in a relationship with Drew and things have been going really well. One day Drew says to 
Alex that they need to talk. Drew tells Alex that s/he is making Drew very unhappy in the 
relationship and that s/he no longer wants to be with Alex. Drew ends the relationship. Alex feels 
emotional pain, starts to feel hot, and her/his heart starts racing. 
Pride Riley is at University and likes to think of her/himself as a very clever person. S/he is also known by 
her/his fellow students as a very clever person. Riley has a very important exam coming up for a 
job s/he really wants and Riley has been studying hard for it. None of her/his fellow students know 
s/he is going for this exam. Riley feels ready for the exam when the day comes. Riley gets the 
results sent to her/him in the post and opens them on her/his own. Riley reads that s/he got a 
very high score. Riley feels pleased and smiles to her/himself 
Accepted Alex is at University and is doing ok, although Alex wishes s/he was doing better. Alex also wishes 
s/he had more friends. One day Frankie comes up to Alex and asks her/him if s/he wants to go out 
with Frankie and her/his friends later. Alex feels warm inside and pleased to be asked. S/he says 
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yes and they swap numbers so they can keep in touch 
 
Participants were then presented with a list of emotion terms, i.e. shame, guilt, humiliation, 
embarrassment, and rejection for negatively valenced scenarios, and pride and acceptance for 
positively valenced experiences. They were then asked (1) to tick one of these that they thought best 
described what they thought the protagonist in the vignette would feel and (2) to rate the strength 
of each emotion they believe the protagonist would feel in the scenario on a rating of 1 (very little) 
to 5 (a lot). The questionnaire was provided on paper to participants in class as part of standard 
teaching activity. Participants were invited to complete the questionnaire and if they agreed for their 
results to be part of the study they returned their questionnaire. Ethical approval was granted 
through the University’s ethical review process.  
Data Analysis 
The data was collated and inputted into SPSS version 24. Descriptive statistics were generated for 
the population and categorization for each vignette. To perform statistical analyses on the ratings of 
the strength of feeling for each emotion in the vignettes, an ANOVA with repeated measures was 
used. This is used to compare group means where the participants are the same in each group (Field, 
2013).   
Results 
Table 4 presents the data for the term chosen as the most appropriate label for the scenario 
together with the data associated with repeated measures ANOVAs of the participants' ratings for 
the emotions.  
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Table 4: Participants' categorization and ratings for each scenario 
Vignette  n Guilt Shame 
Embarrassme
nt 
Humiliation Rejection F 
Guilt 
(consequence 
focus) 
Categorization 
124 118 
(95.2%) 
4 
(3.2%) 
2 
(1.6%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
 
Rating 
117 M=4.65 
SD=0.56 
M=2.81 
SD=1.09 
M=2.54 
SD=1.06 
M=1.74 
SD=0.90 
M=1.39 
SD=0.73 
299.71* 
Guilt 
(moral 
transgression 
focus) 
Categorization 
121 86 
(69.4%) 
23 
(18.5%) 
10 
(8.1%) 
2 
(1.6%) 
0 
(0%) 
 
Rating 
111 M=4.06 
SD=1.01 
M=3.00 
SD=1.26 
M=2.40 
SD=1.24 
M=1.76 
SD=1.02 
M=1.18 
SD=0.61 
158.269* 
Shame 
(private) 
Categorization 
124 1 
(0.8%) 
46 
(37.1%) 
25 
(20.2%) 
32 
(25.8%) 
20 
(16.1%) 
 
Rating 
111 M=1.72 
SD=1.00 
M=3.78 
SD=1.22 
M=3.84 
SD=1.00 
M=3.71 
SD=1.11 
M=2.97 
SD=1.42 
76.90* 
Shame 
(public) 
 
Categorization 
124 0 
(0%) 
4 
(3.2%) 
54 
(43.5%) 
60 
(48.4%) 
2 
(1.6%) 
 
Rating 
111 M=1.70 
SD=1.02 
M=3.45 
SD=1.81 
M=4.50 
SD=0.71 
M=4.26 
SD=0.99 
M=2.36 
SD=1.23 
172.612* 
Shame (moral 
transgression 
focus) 
Categorization 
120 72 
(58.1%) 
49 
(39.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(2.4%) 
0 
(0%) 
 
Rating 
115 M=4.51 
SD=0.69 
M=4.17 
SD=0.91 
M=2.48 
SD=1.23 
M=1.74 
SD=0.97 
M=1.23 
SD=0.59 
343.634* 
Embarrassme
nt 
Categorization 
124 1 
(0.8%) 
2 
(1.6%) 
105 
(84.7%) 
16 
(12.9%) 
0 
(0%) 
 
Rating 
114 M=1.11 
SD=0.50 
M=1.82 
SD=1.06 
M=4.17 
SD=0.88 
M=3.11 
SD=1.23 
M=1.51 
SD=0.87 
315.428* 
Humiliation 
Categorization 
124 0 
(0%) 
3 
(2.4%) 
5 
(4.0%) 
82 
(66.1%) 
34 
(27.4%) 
 
Rating 
115 M=1.28 
SD=0.69 
M=2.32 
SD=1.26 
M=3.77 
SD=1.02 
M=4.41 
SD=0.89 
M=3.87 
SD=1.17 
216.370* 
Rejection 
Categorization 
116 8 
(6.5%) 
1 
(0.8%) 
1 
(0.8%) 
3 
(2.4%) 
103 
(83.1%) 
 
Rating 
106 M=2.25 
SD=1.34 
M=2.50 
SD=1.18 
M=2.59 
SD=1.20 
M=2.99 
SD=1.11 
M=4.74 
SD=0.67 
107.367* 
Vignette  N Pride Acceptance F 
Pride 
Categorization 
117 107 
(86.3%) 
10 
(8.1%) 
 
Rating 
108 M=4.74 
SD=0.66 
M=3.43 
SD=1.17 
88.671* 
Acceptance 
Categorization 
116 4 
(3.2%) 
112 
(90.3%) 
 
Rating 
107 M=2.73 
SD=1.04 
M=4.77 
SD=0.49 
351.735* 
*< .001  
Guilt: The guilt scenario that focused on the detrimental effects of the person’s actions on another 
was categorized as guilt by 118(95%) participants, showing a clear trend within this group. This was 
further supported by participants’ ratings for the strength of feeling for each emotion using a 
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repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
violated, χ2 (9,N=117)=30.91, p=< .001, while the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ε as 
0.89, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity 
(ε=0.92). The results show that there was a statistical difference between the mean ratings of the 
emotions (F(3.686, 427.523)=299.707, p=< .001). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction 
revealed that the mean guilt rating (M=4.65,SD=0.56), which was rated as the strongest emotion 
felt, was statistically significantly different to the mean rating of shame (M=2.81,SD=1.09, p=< .001), 
embarrassment (M=2.54,SD=1.06, p=< .001), humiliation (M=1.74,SD=0.90, p=< .001), and rejection 
(M=1.39,SD=0.73, p=< .001).  
Where the primary focus of the guilt scenario was the moral transgression, rather than the 
consequence of their actions, however, fewer participants’ categorized the vignette as guilt (N=86), 
although this was still a majority (69%). A repeated measures ANOVA was used and Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(9,N=111)=29.19, p=.001, while the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ε as 0.90, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected 
using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε=0.94). The results determined that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the mean ratings of the emotions (F(3.747, 
412.141)=158.269, p=< .001). The post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction showed the mean 
guilt rating (M=4.06,SD=1.01), the highest rated emotion, to be statistically significantly different 
from shame (M=3.00,SD-1.26, p=< .001), embarrassment (M=2.40,SD=1.24, p=< .001), humiliation 
(M=1.76,SD=1.02, p=< .001), and rejection (M=1.18,SD=0.61, p=< .001). From the results of both the 
guilt vignettes we can conclude that guilt is a distinguishable self-conscious emotion and that the 
proposed emotion concept from study 1 defines the identifiable components of a typical experience 
of guilt within this sample. 
Shame: Shame was used by 46(37%) participants to categorize the shame in private vignette. It was, 
however, categorized as humiliation by 32(26%), embarrassment by 25(20%), and rejection by 
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20(16%) participants. This result was reflected within the repeated measures ANOVA. Again 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(9,N=116)=52.11, 
p=< .001, while the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ε as 0.82, therefore degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε=0.85). This determined that 
while there was a statistical difference between the mean ratings of the emotions (F(3.391, 
389.985)=76.901, p=< .001), the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed the mean 
shame rating (M=3.78,SD=1.22) to be only statistically significantly different to guilt 
(M=1.72,SD=1.00, p=< .001) and rejection (M=2.97,SD=1.42, p=< .001). It did not show a statistically 
significant difference between the mean shame rating and that of embarrassment (M=3.84,SD=1.00, 
p=1.00) or humiliation (M=3.71,SD=1.11, p=1.00).  
The same scenario became less recognizable as shame by the participants as it moved from being a 
private experience to being a public one. Only 4(3%) participants categorized this vignette as shame, 
while 60(48%) categorized it as humiliation and 54(43.5%) as embarrassment, a finding reflected 
within the repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated, χ2(9,N=111)=25.76, p=.002, while the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ε 
as 0.88, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity 
(ε=0.92). The results determined the mean ratings differed statistically significantly between the 
emotions (F(3.661,402.760)=172.612, p=< .001), while the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni 
correction revealed the mean shame rating (M=3.45,SD=1.81), which was higher than the mean of 
guilt (M=1.70,SD=1.02) and rejection (M=2.36,SD=1.23), was statistically significantly different from 
both (guilt p=<.001 and rejection, p=< .001). The mean of shame was, however, lower than that of 
embarrassment (M=4.50,SD=0.71) and humiliation (M=4.26,SD=0.99) which was shown to be a 
statistically significant difference to both (embarrassment p=< .001 and humiliation p=< .001).  
Where the vignette focus was a moral transgression, more participants categorized this experience 
as guilt (N=72, 58%) than shame (N=49, 40%). This finding was repeated in the repeated measures 
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ANOVA, where Mauchly’s test showed the assumption of sphericity had been violated, 
χ2(9,N=115)=56.76, p= < .001, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ε as 0.83, so degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε=0.85). This determined that 
the mean ratings differed statistically significantly between the emotions 
(F(3.409,388.683)=343.634, p=< .001). Yet while the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction 
revealed that the mean shame rating (M=4.17,SD=0.91) was statistically significantly different to 
embarrassment (M=2.48,SD=1.23, p=< .001), humiliation (M=1.74,SD=0.97, p=< .001) and rejection 
(M=1.23,SD=0.59, p=< .001), it was lower than the mean for guilt, which was shown to be a 
statistically significant difference (M=4.51,SD=0.69, p=.024). The results from these three shame 
vignettes have not identified a clear experience of shame, distinguishable from embarrassment and 
humiliation.  
Embarrassment: The embarrassment vignette was categorized as embarrassment by 105(85%) of 
the participants. This result was reflected in the repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchly’s test showed 
the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(9,N=114)=45.10, p=< .001, the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction estimated ε as 0.86, so degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt 
estimates of sphericity (ε=0.89). The results showed the mean ratings of the emotions differed 
statistically significantly (F(3.550,401.117)=315.428, p=< .001). The post hoc tests using the 
Bonferroni correction determined that there was a statistically significant difference between the 
mean embarrassment rating (M=4.17,SD=0.88) and the mean ratings for shame (M=1.82,SD=1.06, 
p=< .001), guilt (M=1.11,SD=0.5, p=< .001), humiliation (M=3.11,SD=1.23, p=< .001), and rejection 
(M=1.51,SD=0.87, p=< .001). From this we can conclude that embarrassment is a distinguishable self-
conscious emotion and that the proposed emotion concept from study 1 defines the identifiable 
components of a typical experience of embarrassment within this sample. 
Humiliation: The humiliation vignette was categorized as humiliation by 82(66%) of the participants, 
while 34(27%) of participants categorized it as rejection. The ratings of strength of feeling of the 
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different emotions for the scenario, however, revealed humiliation to be anticipated as the 
strongest emotion by the participants using a repeated measures ANOVA. Again Mauchly’s test 
showed the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(9,N=114)=61.52, p=< .001, and the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction estimated ε as 0.79, so degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε=0.81). The results identified a statistically significant 
difference between the mean ratings of the emotions (F(3.247,366.915)=216.370, p=< .001). The 
post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed a statistically significant difference between 
the mean humiliation rating (M=4.41,SD=0.89) and that of shame (M=2.32,SD=1.26, p=< .001), guilt 
(M=1.28,SD=0.69, p=< .001), embarrassment (M=3.77,SD=1.02, p=< .001), and rejection 
(M=3.87,SD=1.17, p=.007). From this we can conclude that humiliation is a distinguishable self-
conscious emotion and that the proposed emotion concept from study 1 defines the identifiable 
components of a typical experience of humiliation within the sample. 
Rejection: The rejection vignette was categorized as such by 103(83%) of participants. The 
participants’ ratings were subject to a repeated measures ANOVA and Mauchly’s test showed the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(9,N=109)=52.19, p=< .001, and the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction estimated ε as 0.79, so degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt 
estimates of sphericity (ε=0.82). The results determined that mean scores differed statistically 
significantly between the emotions (F(3.279,344.319)=107.367, p=< .001) and the post hoc tests 
using the Bonferroni correction revealed a statistically significant difference between the mean 
rejection rating (M=4.74,SD=0.67) and that of shame (M=2.50,SD=1.18, p=< .001), guilt 
(M=2.25,SD=1.34, p=< .001), embarrassment (M=2.59,SD=1.20, p=< .001), and humiliation 
(M=2.99,SD=1.11, p=< .001). From this we can conclude that rejection is a distinguishable emotion 
and that the proposed emotion concept from study 1 defines the identifiable components of a 
typical experience of rejection within the sample. 
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Pride and Acceptance: The pride vignette was categorized as pride by 107(86%) of participants. The 
repeated measures ANOVA identified the mean scores between the emotions to differ statistically 
significantly (F(1, 107)=88.671, p=< .001), while the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction 
showed a statistically significant difference between the mean rating for pride (M=4.74,SD=0.66) and 
the mean rating for acceptance (M=3.43,SD=1.17, p=< .001). As there were only 2 emotions to rate 
for this vignette, sphericity was met, similarly for the acceptance vignette. The acceptance vignette 
was categorized as acceptance by 112(90%) participants. The repeated measures ANOVA showed 
the mean ratings to be statistically significantly different between the emotions (F(1, 106)=351.735, 
p=< .001) and the post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction identified a statistically significant 
difference between the mean acceptance rating (M=4.77,SD=0.49) and that of pride 
(M=2.73,SD=1.04, p=< .001). From these results we can conclude that pride and acceptance are 
distinguishable emotions and that the proposed emotion concepts from study 1 define the 
components of a typical experience of these emotions within the sample. 
Summary  
As hypothesized, the emotion concepts identified from study 1 did predict how those within a 
similar sociocultural context categorized the vignettes. With the exception of shame, the vignettes 
could clearly be identified as an instance of the predicted emotion both through categorization (H1) 
and through strength of feeling on the rating scale (H2). Not only were pride, shame, guilt, 
humiliation, and embarrassment considered distinct experiences, but pride and acceptance, and 
shame and rejection, were considered different types of experience. The vignette for shame 
(private), however, produced some interesting findings. One the one hand, the vignette developed 
from the concept identified in study 1 was categorized by most people as shame. On the other hand, 
this was only 37 per cent of people, suggesting the vignette was not as clear an instance of shame as 
the other vignettes were for their respective emotion terms. Furthermore, there was no difference 
in the strength of feeling as measured by the rating scale for shame, humiliation, or embarrassment, 
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suggesting this was not considered an experience of shame above the latter emotions. The 
introduction of a physical audience, meanwhile, reduced shame as the most highly chosen term to 
categorize the vignette and increased humiliation and embarrassment as both the chosen category 
and strength of feeling. This, at least, does not support a link between the participants’ 
understanding of an ideal-typical experience of shame being a public experience and supports the 
link between shame being considered a private affair (H1b). Further still, deviating from the ideal-
typical experience of shame from study 1 by focusing on a moral transgression resulted in the 
vignette being categorized as guilt, with guilt being considered to be the most intense emotion felt 
in that situation, no matter what the thought or action within the experience. Not only does this 
further support guilt’s link with moral transgressions but it also supports the idea that shame was 
understood within the group to be more an issue of failing to meet a personal standard (H1a).  
Discussion 
These studies contribute to our understanding of these emotions by deepening our knowledge of 
how they are experienced, which, in turn, challenges how they are conceptualized within established 
theories. To start, an experience of an emotion was constituted by a range of components. While 
not all of these components were necessary for a person to categorize their experience with one of 
the emotion terms, an emotion term could not be reduced to a single component. What people 
meant, therefore, when using a specific term was that their experience was broadly consistent with 
their understanding of what the term meant. This finding suggests a difference between individual 
emotional experience and social agreements about what specific emotion labels mean. People can 
feel differently but categorize their experience with the same label. Given a broad enough set of 
individual experiences we can identify the social meaning attached to such experiences. In more 
complex situations, individual experience is not able to be categorized neatly with one label but 
rather a range of terms is needed, such as by saying I feel ashamed and guilty. This did not mean 
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there was no difference between the social understanding of the terms shame and guilt, just that 
that individual experience was not accurately described by a single term in that instance. 
Generally, the labels represented different types of experience, which is a finding that supports 
some established basic emotion theories (e.g. Kemper, 1987; Gilbert, 2003) and some appraisal 
theories (e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002), while challenging some basic emotion theories that claim 
otherwise (e.g. Tomkins, 1963; Nathanson, 1994; Scheff, 2000) or constructionist theories that do 
not provide sufficient descriptions about these distinctions (e.g. Gordon, 1981). The exception to 
these emotions being easily identifiable as distinct concerned the concept of shame in relation to 
humiliation and embarrassment. Study 2 confirmed that the concepts derived from study 1 relating 
to humiliation and embarrassment were distinct. It also confirmed that the concepts for humiliation 
and embarrassment could be distinguished from shame. The concept of shame, however, could not 
be distinguished from those of humiliation and embarrassment. It is possible that study 1 did not 
identify the concept of shame adequately or that study 2 was not faithful to the concept from study 
1. Notwithstanding such methodological limitations, these results pose a question about the 
collective understanding of shame, at least within this sample. It is possible that while the other 
emotions are more clearly identifiable, shame is a more ambiguous term related to personal failures. 
Indeed, it is possible that much of the academic debate about the precise experience of the emotion 
stems from shame being a term for a more general experience. What we can conclude from these 
findings, however, is that, within this population, shame involved a negative self-evaluation due to 
feeling personally responsible for failing to meet some important personal standard. While this 
supports some established basic emotion (e.g. Gilbert, 2003) and appraisal theories (e.g. Lewis, 
1971), it also challenges appraisal (e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002), constructionist (e.g. Harré, 
1990) and basic emotion theories (e.g. Turner 2000) that limit experiences of shame to moral 
transgressions.  
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An important finding in relation to the experience of these emotions relates to shame, pride, 
acceptance, and rejection. While there were experiences that were classified as pride and 
acceptance, and others shame and rejection, these studies demonstrated they were distinguishable 
experiences, having different social contexts, personal roles, and foci. From a pragmatic perspective, 
therefore, these studies suggest it is useful to conceive of rejection and acceptance as distinct 
emotional experiences that relate to the state of the relationship, rather than a focus on the self. A 
person can feel rejected and not feel that this is because there is something wrong with them (and, 
therefore, feel shame). Equally, a person can feel accepted and not feel that this is due to some 
personal achievement (and, therefore, feel pride). So while pride and shame are experienced in 
relation to others, they are inherently ‘self-conscious’ emotions. Equally, therefore, we can make a 
distinction between them and acceptance and rejection by saying that while these emotions involve 
the self, they can be more usefully defined as ‘relation-conscious’ emotions. While this distinction 
was clear in these data, it challenges long standing basic emotion (e.g. Scheff, 2000, 2014; Gilbert, 
2003; Elison, 2005) and constructionist theories (e.g. de Rivera  and Grinkis, 1986; Pattison, 2000) on 
these emotions, while supporting some appraisal theories (e.g. Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Gausel 
and Leach, 2010).  
By focusing on real-time, context-specific, lived-experience, these findings have identified that while 
there is some support for some aspects of established theories, there are no theories that can fully 
explain and predict how these emotions were experienced by the participants and their wider 
understanding of these terms. From a pragmatic perspective (Morgan, 2007), this finding has two 
implications. The first relates to how these emotions have been defined within established theories. 
Most theories have defined these emotions at an individual level of analysis, seeking to identify the 
biological, physiological, psychological, or other individual attribute that produces the experience. 
Such an approach has, however, been critiqued by some, such as Barrett (2006), to argue that this 
results in conceptualizations of emotional experience that are too restrictive to account for the 
variation in emotion experience. Furthermore, others, such as Averill (2012), argue that this 
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approach also denies the social forces that help to create such individual emotional experiences. 
Other theories, therefore, define these emotions at a social level of analysis, seeking to identify the 
social interactions and processes that produce the experience. This approach has also been critiqued 
by some, such as Barbalet (2001), who argues that this defines emotions as social representations 
without identifying them as such, which again minimizes the variability in actual experience. The 
findings in this paper, based on a return to experience, have identified the need to be explicit about 
both, so we are able to understand how social concepts are created, maintained, and changed, 
while, at the same time, structuring, shaping, and defining individual emotional experience. While 
there remain questions about how to define shame as a distinct experience from humiliation and 
embarrassment, study 1 clearly defined the social representations for the other emotions. They, 
therefore, provide a more detailed social concept for the analysis of individual experience and social 
interaction. 
The second implication of these findings relates to the ontological foundations of how these 
emotions have been conceptualized. This paper has identified and defined, for the study population, 
what it means to experience pride, guilt, humiliation, embarrassment, acceptance, and rejection, 
while also problematizing tight definitions for shame. Pragmatically, the experience of these 
emotions involved cognitive and biological processes in relation to social processes that created the 
standards through which individuals came to evaluate themselves in the moment and provide the 
possibilities for action. All of these components were experienced as the emotion and some 
elements could not be distinguished as somehow separate from the ‘real’ emotion. This conclusion 
contrasts with foundationalist arguments of basic emotion, and some appraisal and weak 
constructionist, theories, instead, supporting anti-foundationalist arguments made by strong 
constructionist, and some appraisal, theories.   
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